Theory says the Burma Regime is Falling?!
Stellan Vinthagen September 30th, 2007
My prediction, built on contemporary revolution theories, is that the regime of Burma will fall and/or accept democratisation during October. I speculate but build my thinking on John Foran (1997, Theorising Revolutions) and Jörgen Johansen (2007, forthcoming). Foran builds a theory of revolution on about 35 cases from the last 100 years and Johansen show the pattern of a “wave” of “nonviolent revolutions”built on a study of all irregular regime changes the latest 20 years. Burma seems to fit all criteria. Thus a “nonviolent revolution” is approaching!
We have seen hopefull and impressive resistance in Burma during the last month, and the last days, despite violent repression a brave committment to continue the struggle. What are the chances of a revolution in Burma or a democratisation of the military rule of Burma since 1962?
The uprising in 1988 was organised by the Rangoon university students. It was violently crushed. At least 3 000 persons were killed and the movement effectively destroyed, forced into exile and underground. Also this time the students took the initiative. Already one year ago students started to organise various open protests. And half a year ago they succeeded in getting several thousands to sign a petition for democracy. Signing a petition is, in Burma, a very brave thing to do since you give your name to an open list against the government. Already participation in a peaceful demonstration can lead to imprisonment and torture…
Between 1988 and 2006 Burma has been a case of what James Scott calls the “hidden transcripts” of “everyday resistance”. The opposition has rarely been visible in public but is was very alive underground, behind the backs of the regime, taking more subtle forms. That kind of resistance is a lot more difficult to detect (also for researchers) but it has been there, built on the popular (but hidden) criticism of the military junta, evident in the overwhelming election victory of the democratic opposition party 1990 (which the junta totally ignored…).
The hidden resistance has obviously built a resistance culture strong enough for the popular uprising we see today. The students made some attempts a year ago but when the dramatic rise of fuel prices came a month ago ordinary and angry citizens took to the streets. It was only after that the monks begun to demonstrate.
Johansen (2007) claims that the majority of irregular regime changes since 1980 (if we don’t count simple military coups) is done through major peaceful demonstrations, e.g. in the Ukraine, Georgia, Serbia, South Africa, Poland, East Germany, etc. The pattern is that big demonstrations in the capital is combined with various strikes, civil disobedience and other peaceful resistance, and when (major parts of) the military leadership change their loyalty (or refuse to fire on civilians) the regime falls. Burma seems, at least when it comes to the major demonstrations in the capital, to be part of this pattern. But, as Johansen also points out, we have several cases of failed attempts of regime change, e.g. Burma 1988 or China 1989. The question then is WHEN is such a revolutionary change possible?
If we add the theory of revolution from Foran (1997) we can also see under what circumstances such (nonviolent) revolutions is able to succeed. Foran claims that successful revolutions in the “Third World” in the last century is explained through five factors. 1) A repressive, exclusionist and personalist regime 2) Economic dependency structure (non-diversified economy dependent on few products and/or colonial economy) 3) An economic downturn or crisis 4) An opening in the world-system (i.e. global and/or regional strong states’ support or acceptance of the opposition) 5) An oppositional culture (a somewhat developed discourse and history of opposition materialised in an infra-structure of critical groups/movements). Burma seems to fill the conditions of them all as far as I understand it.
1) The regime has since 1962 oppressed people systematically. Some claim houndreds of thousands have been murded and about 1,5 million driven into internal exil or abroad. Torture is regular and repression has not only been against oppositional groups but as well ethnically oriented, excluding major groups from the nation. The strong support of Buddhism has been one major attempt to gain legitimacy. Exactly what they loose right now when not only thousands of munks lead the demonstrations but also are the victims of the repression, angering ordinary people.
2) Burma was regarded one of the richest countries in Asia at the time of the coup 1962, it is today one of the poorest countries in the world. It is a resource rich country making some to describe it as a “tiger economy in a cage”. The economy is today built mainly on China, only partly on other countries, e.g. Russia, India, Australia or French oil companies. The long boycott of Burma has made the country even more dependent on China.
3) The major protests happend a month ago when fuel prices were raised between 200-500 % making many workers barely able to pay their transport to their work…
4) There has been a long time of opening in the support of Western states of the democratic opposition but the major difference now is that it seems like China is not giving unconditional support to the regime anymore. This is hard to know but according to official statements China asks the regime not to use violence against the opposition. And China is under pressure (mainly because of the Olympic Summer Games in China next year) which already made China to slightly change its policy in Sudan which made the difference for the regime in Karthoum (accepting UN Peacekeepers into Darfur). And, China might very well have a greater need of a stable democratic Burma as a buffert zone, then an unstable authoritarian regime (compare e.g. the latest developments in Nepal). Still China is blocking UN from intervening or increasing the boycott of Burma and it will also matter what Russia and India does.
5) The latest one month (as well as the latest year) has shown that not only students and monks but as well ordinary people have overcome their fear and established enough links to sustain demonstrations for several weeks. And according to the main exile news agency Irrawaddy not only 30 000 demonstrated in Rangoon on the Saturday after the military occupation of the streets and the killings of at least nine persons, but there were also demonstrations in several other cities, one with as many as 5 000 (see http://www.irrawaddy.org/ or .com since they had to change site two days ago after a virus attack). Thus, the opposition is obviously rooted in the Burmeese Buddhist culture and is strong enough to sustain its resistance during military repression (so far…).
It all might sound obvious and clear but it is acctually difficult to make any judgement. The access to information is not good enough and I am not knowledgeable enough on Burma. The question mark, though, is in what sense there really is a world-system opening for Burma and how strong the oppositional culture is.
We simply don’t know how China acts inofficially and how sensitive the Chineese government is to (weak) international pressure. It is of course not unlikely that China says something officially and something else inofficially.
We also don’t know how strong the opposition is. Now is very much a struggle of will and organisational capacity. Will the opposition be able to sustain demonstrations despite the increased risk of imprisonment, torture and repression? Does the opposition have enough of a strategy and leadership which can take over now when Burma is hunting all known leaders? Will the democratic party of Suu Kyi which does have the support of a vast majority of the people be able to make the struggle spread to strikes, civil disobedience and, most importantly, to the military officers and police force?
We don’t know these things for sure, but just by looking on the historical trend of the last 30 years (Johansen 2007) and the factors facilitating revolutions in poor countries (Foran 1997) we can conclude that the days of the Burmeese regime is counted…
Or what do you think? Please add your comments!
- Boycott , China , Democracy , Protest , Resistance , Revolution
- Comments(12)
So the grand universal theories of stages, right timing, cause and effect reductionism, historical necessity, statistical probability explaining the world are back!? Thanks for a good review!
Well, I don’t use any of those concepts (and sure didn’t know I was such an old fashioned modernist) but thank you, if you want to call it that you are welcome, so yes they “are back”. But, labeling and shaming others seems to exist like before, somthing that never really did go out of fashion.
If this counts as old modernism, then count me in! I do not see any reductionism, rather the predictions are built on qualitative and emergent properties in social change. A central question for resistance studies, to me, is “what does it take for resistance to turn into social change?”. I believe that this process may be described, patterned and even predicted, however, not as “laws” but rather as “processes”.
We must dare to leave nonproductive stigma echoing in the backwaters of postmodernism, literary theory and textism and get back to the real material world.
I think my comment could be misunderstood, sorry. I was not criticizing Stellans text but the two books.
1 Stellan did an excellent review of the two books.
2 I think one of the best way to test theories explaining what is happening all over the world is to test them on specific places, like Stellan did on Burma. Thanks for that! I support that approach.
3 I think it is possible to criticize grand theories universalizing nations all over the world without it being nonproductive stigma, like Christopher mentioned.
4 I understand my reflections on the problems with grand theories might not be acceptable here so I will discuss grand theories somewhere else. Stellan and Christopher are two of the owners of Resistance Studies, and I am not, so I will respect your decisions.
5 But I hope I can be part of reflections on other topics on the Resistance Studies.
Hello folks! I have not read the two books, Foran and Jörgensen, but I sure had some lectures with the latter and been reading some political “science†(e.g. a big deal of comparative measures on election systems, economical index, constitutional characteristics and other so called relevant indexes on macro-political phenomena). The general aim according to these epistemologies is about prediction, which we likewise, as Stellan notice, can´t know for sure about. Futher I believe its not only possible, as Per holds, to criticize grand theories without it being a non-productive stigma – I think its necessary. Particularly if we aim to broad the notion of resistance in resistance studies. Some of the established social science disciplines have been dealing with questions of (silent/violent/rapid) social change and revolution for some time now, though generally not being able to recognize and thoroughly criticize the metaphysic assumptions about national states. If one of our aims is to “normalize†everyday resistance, through establishing resistance as a field of knowledge and vice versa, one main necessity should be to theorize “the everyday†as being a question of specific contexts (how many national states and “everydayworlds/practices†are there?). If power as an analytical notion is said to be present everywhere the articulated, material and empirical resistance as a consequence/interaction of it is, I believe, a question of context. It should thus be essential to hold a critical stance against the beloved but problematic grand theories and if it seems to be “non-productive†I would guess the problem arises from the lack of context in the critical stance (the direction of the burden of proof can of course be altered…). Peace´n hugs
I am impressed with this Stellan, I whished I had such a good eye for combining various long term causes.
This is what I am looking for in a closer dimension of small scale “cause and effects” or as Christoffer would have it “emergent properties”. I think I would label the “laws” or “processes” somthing like “mechanisms” (a mechanism being something that seems to be present in many divergent processes causing somthing to change – or from being in a state of dispersion to a state of cennectedness for instance; a “scale shift” as Doug McAdam would have it.). I never take the time to read a long comment all the way through before re-comment on it (caused by some kind of desire for commenting before dropping the line of thought), so I will return to your review again.
But, somthing did cross my mind, again there seem to be too much “macro-causes” involved, and too little knowledge as to the processes that fertilize the composition of networks within the “resistance” camp?
Thanx
Dear all, thanks for comments on the substance of my blog entry (not just the approach of it, be it “grand” or less grand…). Hunar, I think you are right, “context” is essential (!) and that is why I try to apply the theories on the present situation in Burma, but my lack of detailed knowledge of the context make it hard to apply it more closely. I have though, Niklas, tried to apply Foran’s model of “oppositional culture” in a more internal, micro, process way in an article (together with Sean Chabot) on the Indian liberation movement and the landless movement MST in Brazil (“Rethinking Nonviolent Action and Contentious Politics: Political Cultures of Nonviolent Opposition in the Indian Independence Movement and Brazil’s Landless Workers Movementâ€, in Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, Vol. 27, 2007.). In that we try to understand the emergent processes that together make a oppositional culture (or resistance culture). If you read my earlier blog entries on revolution theory you will see that cause and effect reductionism is not really what contemporary revolution theory is about anymore. I am inspiered by these later developments of revolution theory, in which micro-macro, structure-agency, political economy and culture, etc. are combined. A difficult and maybe messy approach but interesting. I tried to apply that kind of dynamic approach in which the agency of resistance cultures (in a specific context) is what matters, although not alone but in in interaction with other major actors (as e.g. state governments and military forces) and within a favourable opportunity structure.
Anyhow, I would be happy if blog entries, which are by its very nature more explorative and less processed thoughts/formulations, could be dealt with by a respectful discussion of such kind you have done here, not statements which simply label it within a low-value chategory, e.g. “grand theory”, without even making it clear why. Thanks Hunar and Niklas for constructive engagement with my scribble…
I am reading news from Burmese opposition groups and am finding news about demonstrations, arrests and resistance which is not told in our conventional news. Of course mainstream media is not telling the truth about resistance, but I am surprised of the compact mainstream (and somewhat critical) media consensus on that the resistance in Burma is over now. It happend instantly in the beginning of this week. All media telling the same story: now the resistance is over. But on the 3 Oct 10 000 people demonstrated in the town of Arakan in Burma. And a new action is spreading among citizens of Rangoon: when the state (propaganda) news are sent on TV and Radio, people turn of the light in their appartment (showing they are NOT listening to the regime…). And on the 4 Oct over 100 members of Suu Kyi’s National League of Democracy (the party that won 88 % of the votes in the only election, 1990) were arrested. And numerous Monks and citizens of Rangoon are still getting arrested in all day raids around in Rangoon. Why is the regime arresting so many people if they are not afraid of more protests coming? And, where are the students, have anyone heard from them? They were the ones who lead the uprising in 1988 and now they are quite. Are they crushed, scattered, disorganised or are they the next group who will make open confrontation with the regime? My guess is that the foreign journalists either went home, are only staying in hotels in Rangoon and don’t speak local languages, so, logically, they don’t have any clue if the resistance has ended or not…
Thanx for an important contribution to the discussion on “resistance” culture. It sounds interesting the things you say about your study of the MST etc.
I have some concerns about my own field as to how to conceive of the “macro-dimension” of a somewhat non-localizable “anti- or alterglobalization movement”. You speak about, for instance, politico-economic factors or causes (opportunities/risks) as something that are part of a process of several instances combined making impact as to the formation of “resistance” or oppositional practice. But how do someone make sense of an “alterglobalization” movement who’s got no clearcut “action frame” or something like a non-localizable “search for” opportunity structure? I think that I too long have been focusing on what you label as “the agency of resistance cultures (in a specific context)” and not payed enough attention to the “macrodimension” of things. Could be that it seems to be such a “deathtrip” to try to flesh out such a context. May be that the social forumprocess (my area of interest) is constantly resisting to get subjected to representations/unifying signifiers?
Well, the struggle continues… [...]
//N.
Stimulating Stellan.
In situations such as these, there’s a lot more going on under the surface than we know at the time. Not just hidden transcripts, but manoeuvring between different factions of the elite and their international supporters, etc … There are also some random factors.
So the only way I will ever be convinced that a theorist can predict the outcome of insurrections is when they start doing it with some regularity in advance.
You’ve nailed your flag to the mast with your prediction that the regime will fall this month.
Very brave.
In 1989 I know someone in New York who did quite well by placing bets on each of the power people movements … Now a betting book might be interesting …
all the best
Howard
On the 30th of Sept I was offered a beer in the bet by one who thought I was wrong. I guess now the odds are a lot lower for my prediction, or? ; – ) So, Howard, what is your bet against the stamina of the Burmeese?! What are you risking on your own implicit theory and prediction (it sounds like you have one…)??
Dears
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